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THE PENNSYLVANIA PLANt
By LANGDON W. HARRIS, JR.*
N 1934 the American Bar Association sent questionnaires to 1430 bar as-
sociations throughout the country asking whether a change in the method
of selecting judges was desirable. The results showed that states where
judges were appointed were opposed to a change; where judges were elected
lawyers were dissatisfied and wanted something new. The objections to the
elective method were:
1. Political influence outweighs merit.
2. It is not possible in statewide or urban elections for voters to estimate the
qualifications of the candidates.
3. Judges are intimidated by political leaders.
4. Lawyers of the highest qualifications are not attracted by a career on the
bench.
In 1939 a poll of the public was taken and 28% of those questioned
said, in effect, that they did not think our local courts were honest. Though
this is not true, it is damaging to the the courts' prestige and confidence in
them.
The latest Gallup Poll on this subject presented a question as to whether
judges in their areas were selected on the basis of experience or politics. 28%
thought experience; 29% didn't know; and 43% thought politics.
t Editor's Note: The Pennsylvania Plan as herein set forth has been broadly praised and en-
dorsed. The following endorsements were given by two of the most notable and learned state
jurists of our day:
"The two greatest ideals of America are the attainment of world peace and the administration
of justice, and as far as the latter is concerned it has alwas been our proud boast that our judicial
system is our shining glory. To warrant that encomium, however, our courts must be manned only
by judges of professional ability, scholarly attainments, worldly wisdom, integrity and independence.
If subjected to political influence, they cannot have such independence. Partisan politics is properly
a consideration in the case of executives and legislators, but it has no place whatever in the realm
of the judiciary. The Pennsylvania Plan would insure the selection of judges on the sole basis of
competency, without any obligation other than to administer the law wisely and without fear or
favor. The Plan has worked admirably in Missouri and it should, in my opinion, be adopted in
our Commonwealth."-HORACE STERN, former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
"The basic consideration in every judical establishment is the caliber of its personnel. The
law as administered cannot be better than the judge who expounds it. In addition to being learned
in the law and deeply versed in the mysteries of human nature, a judge must be independent, im-
partial and honest, beholden to no man or group. Equally important, he must be known by all
men to be subject only to the dictates of his own conscience and to be influenced only by the law
and the facts of the particular case before him. The Pennsylvania Plan for the selection of judges
which the Pennsylvania Bar Association and the Philadelphia Bar Association are recommending
is far more likely to result in the selection of judges meeting these high standards than in the
elective system. The plan merits the approval of the L.egislature and the People of Pennsylvania."-
ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, the late Chief Justice, Supreme Court of New Jersey.
* Chairman of the Philadelphia Bar Association and the Pennsylvania Bar Association Commit-
tees on the Pennsylvania Plan for the Selection and Tenure of Judges, B.A., Cornell University;
LL.B., Temple University. Member of the firm of Harris, Hammond and Harris.
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These facts demonstrate the sad but sure truth that lawyers and the
public alike know that the most important function of government, the ad-
ministration of justice, is just where it should not be-in the political arena.
A GOOD START AND A FALSE MOVE
Those who planned our government were determined that our judges
should be free, and originally judges were appointed and given life tenure
during good behavior. The change in most of the states took place within
twenty years-1830 to 1850, when many, but not all, amended their consti-
tutions to provide for the popular election of judges to hold office for short
terms of years. Ten states resisted this change and retained the appointive
method.
The shift has been attributed to:
1. The struggle for popular control of government that reached a climax over
all the Western world in the 19th century.
2. The democratic fervor during the Jacksonian era and the desire to extend
the election of officials to the judiciary.
3. The hostility toward some life tenure judges who adhered to English rules
and precedents regardless of the unpopularity of English law following the
Revolution.
4. Public feeling in some instances that the courts were unfriendly to the debtor
class.
There were strong protests against the shift to the popular election of
judges and abandonment of secure judicial tenure. Justice Story protested;
Rufus Choate said, "The change will infallibly reduce the rate of men you
will have on the bench." Horace Binney said, "Will judges in general be as
impartial and upright on the trial of a cause when the renewal of their offices
depends upon the favor of one of the parties as they will be when nothing
but misconduct can deprive them of office?" But the progress of the popular
movement surged onward, and only a few states rejected the trend. The
basic cause was not the fault in the existing method, but rather the revolution-
ary ferment demanding greater popular control of government and the vio-
lent swing toward populism.
So, it was not until three-quarters of a century after the Declaration of
Independence that we adopted the elective system; and, excepting some local
courts in Switzerland and what is called the People's Court in the Soviet




THE PRESENT METHOD IS WRONG IN PRINCIPLE
The present short-term elective method with candidates for judgeships
appearing on partisan political ballots has not only been a harmful failure,
but is wrong in principle. People have no real opportunity to participate in
a judicial selection. The system has developed into a selection by political
leaders who are not versed in the responsibility of the court. They are not
elected nor are they answerable to the people. The principle that judges
must be selected by a person or group capable of making a discriminating
choice is violated.
The solid reasons which require the direct election in the other branches
do not exist in the judicial. The judge is not, in the usual sense, a servant
of the people, but rather a servant of the law, a guardian of our constitution,
and an impartial magistrate between litigants. The functions of the various
departments of government differ. It is the legislative and executive depart-
ments which represent, enact and execute the mandates of the majority public
opinion. It is not the function of the judiciary to represent, enact and execute
current views. No policymaking nor any question of majority rule is involved.
On the contrary, courts must at times protect minorities and decide against the
popular prevailing view and restrain the power of the temporary majority.
The courts represent all the people.
The judiciary is the rock of stable government. Legislators are agents
of their constituents, but judges have no constituents. Party responsibility
applies to legislative and executive officials but never to judges. Yet, judges
must appear on partisan political ballots and are not safe from the demands
of politics and 'politicians. In a democratic political system, the judiciary
alone aims at impartiality. The present method, pitting candidates of one
party against candidates of another, violates that impartiality.
Why should a candidate for judge appear on a political ballot? Political
ballots should be reserved for candidates with political issues. Judges have
no political issues. Their sole interest is the dispensation of justice between
individuals or individuals and the state. Frequently the ballot contains names
of contentious candidates for political office with controversial issues that
develop into a bitter and rangling campaign. Judicial candidates then appear
subordinate to the other candidates and may win or lose because of the issues,
with their qualifications completely ignored. It leads to blind voting.
We must establish a method both for the selection and tenure of judges
that is consistent with our principles of government. This would be achieved
by the Pennsylvania Plan for the Selection and Tenure of Judges.
1958.]
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WE MUST HAVE A STRONG JUDICIARY
A strong judiciary demands two features: first, selection by a person or
group capable of making an informed and discriminating choice; and second,
assured tenure of office for worthy judges.
As to selection, in most cases the selection is made by the political
leaders on the basis of party loyalty or friendship. Though lawyers are the
only class of citizens who come in daily contact with the courts and the only
group that is in a position to estimate their qualifications, they have no say
in the selection of judges.
As to tenure, a judgeship requires dedication of service. Dedication is
now unsafe and unprotected.
The lack of tenure of judicial office in this state becomes increasingly
serious. In the past when political strength was lodged in one party, tenure
was more certain. To have two political parties evened off in strength in
the state is a healthy situation from the standpoint of the executive and legis-
lative offices, but such balance adversely affects the'judiciary and continually
places judicial tenure in jeopardy. It has been demonstrated by experience
that honorable and competent judges with splendid records have been un-
justifiably defeated because of politics. This violates the principle that judges
must have an assured tenure of office. With an established unblemished rec-
ord, why should a judge be obliged to neglect his judicial duties to enter the
realm of politics to seek reelection against all newcomers? His record
should be sufficient warranty. Length of service has been conspicuous in
substantially all those who have made their mark in our judicial history. Dean
Pound illustrates that the twelve outstanding judges in American history have
served a quarter of a century. Marshall served 34 years; Story, 32; Gibson,
40; Holmes, 50; and Cardozo, 241/.
THE PENNSYLVANIA PLAN AND ITS OPERATION
A strong judicial system demands a responsible method of choosing and
retaining competent judges. This is accomplished through the Pennsylvania
Plan, which has two routes for success: through the legislature or through a
new or amended constitution. To make it effective through the first method
necessitates a constitutional amendment which requires the approval of the
legislature at two consecutive sessions and also the approval of the voters
of Pennsylvania. The second method, through a new or amended constitu-
tion, is, of course, the shortest way to its adoption. A commission has been
named to study revision of our constitution and literature on this subject has
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been sent to each member, urging that the Pennsylvania Plan be included in
a new or amended constitution.
HOW THE PLAN FUNCTIONS
When a vacancy exists in the office of judge of an appellate court or
in a court of record in Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties, the Governor
shall fill it by appointment from a panel of three persons nominated to him
by a nonpartisan judicial commission. If the names presented to the Governor
are unacceptable to him, the judicial commission will nominate successive
panels until an appointment from a panel is made.
Each judge appointed by the Governor serves a trial period of at least
twelve months and thereafter at an appropriate election-general for appel-
late judge and municipal for local judge--the judge's name is submitted, un-
opposed, to the voters on a separate ballot without party designation. The
single issue is, "Shall Judge be retained in office: Yes_ No _."
If a majority of voters who mark the judicial ballot favor the retention
of the judge in office, he serves for a full term and at its expiration may run
again, unopposed, for another term. He runs on his record only, rather
than against a political opponent. If the judge is not to be retained, the
vacancy is filled by appointment from a panel of three names nominated to
the Governor by the judicial commission.
At any municipal election the qualified voters of any judicial district,
other than Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties (where it will *be manda-
tory) may elect to adopt this Plan, or, having adopted it, may elect to dis-
continue it. Upon adoption of the amendment, all sitting judges in the courts
affected will be subject to the provisions of the Plan.
THE HEART OF THE PLAN
The judicial commission, composed of one judge, three members of the
bar (selected by a plan to be promulgated by the Supreme Court), and three
lay citizens appointed by the Governor, is the heart of the Plan. The com-
mission for the appellate courts is chosen from the state at large and the
commission for each judicial district is chosen from that district. The com-
mission is representative of the bench, the bar, and the public for whom the
courts exist. Its sole function is to search for and implant on the bench the
best qualified lawyers in the community.
No member of the judicial commission during his term of service may
hold any office in any political party or organization, and only the judge may
1958.]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
hold elective public 6ffice. No judge who serves under this Plan may directly
or indirectly make any contribution to, or hold any office in, a political party
or organization, or participate in any political campaign.
The adoption of the Plan will limit the eligibility of future judges to
persons of the highest integrity and ability, who have been selected for nom-
ination to the Governor by a nonpartisan judicial commission.
CONTROL BY THE ELECTORATE
The Plan includes the ultimate control by the electorate as was first pro-
posed by Albert M. Kales in 1914. It embraces the best features of the federal
and elective systems and eliminates the disadvantages of each. The appoin-
tive principle is used in the selection of judges, and the expression of the
electorate is transferred from the function which it cannot properly perform
(selection) to the function which it can perform (voicing approval or dis-
approval resulting in retention or removal from office). It retains popular
control by the electorate but avoids the known evils of political elections.
Under the Plan, the desired short ballot is attained and the judge's record is
not overshadowed by unrelated issues. The necessary safeguards against
judicial inefficiency and corruption are applied; the judges are not removed
from the people; and the judge would be defeated only if his record showed
incompetency. This Plan would result in the selection and retention without
political activity of the competent judge, and would strengthen our judicial
system. a
OUR PLAN Is DEMOCRATIC
The present elective method is democratic in theory only. Though called
an elective method, it is actually an appointive system whereby the appointment
is generally made from selections by party leaders. Ex-Governor Alfred E.
Smith, an authority on the practical side of government, said, "In the long run
(the elective system) means the selection of judges by political leaders and the
ratification of their selection by an electorate who are not really in a position
to pass upon the legal and other abilities of the individual." The high office
of judge must not rest on such an ignoble foundation.
Why should political leaders, and not the public, be given recognition in
the selection of judicial candidates? Lawyers who by experience know judicial
timber are given no true recognition. What opportunity does the public have
to suggest candidates for judicial office? What method is used to screen candi-
dates? What chance does a man fitted for a judgeship have on ability only?
[VOL. 62
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The Pennsylvania Plan offers a more democratic idea. Names for judicial
office may be submitted to the commission by the public. It may participate
directly, become acquainted with the final selection, follow the judge's record,
and be in a position to vote when he later appears on an understandable
judicial ballot.
THE PLAN IS SUCCESSFUL IN MISSOURI
Many states having our elective system seek a change, and in every
instance they adopt the principles of the Pennsylvania Plan. The Missouri
Plan, substantially the same, has had a seasoned operation there for over seven-
teen years, and its success has made it a paragon. Missouri has removed from
her courts the iron grip of a political machine. Its court plan is being heralded
as a national model for state courts of our country.
Here is unimpeachable evidence of its success in Missouri:
1. Philip Donnelly, the present Governor, though a Democrat, in making
his last 15 appointments named seven Republicans although he could have
named all from his own party. This shattering of party lines sets a precedent
in American judicial history. This represents partisan appointment of only
53.3 percent; it far excels the record of our federal judiciary, which, from
President Cleveland to President Truman, shows these partisan appointments:
Cleveland 97.3 percent, Harrison 87.9 percent, McKinley 95.7 percent, Theo-
dore Roosevelt 95.8 percent, Taft 82.2 percent, Wilson 98.7 percent, Harding
97.7 percent, Coolidge 94.1 percent, Hoover 85.7 percent, F. D. Roosevelt 97
percent, and Truman 92.2 percent.
2. Hon. Jacob M. Lashly, former President of the American Bar Associa-
tion, in an address in Baltimore on October 12, 1956, stated:
"At the general elections between the years 1942 and 1956, inclusive, the
election results alternated. The state went Republican twice, Democratic
three times, and one time (1952) Republican in the Presidential election and
Democratic as to state offices. During that period 53 judges came up for
retention upon their respective records. In not a single instance did the voters
discriminate as to party politics in their votes upon the judicial ticket. The
uniformity with which the election results reveal an utter indifference to the
political complexion of the judges whose records were on trial leaves no doubt




3. Former Chief Justice James M. Douglas, who served under the old
elective system and the present plan, says:
"In my opinion the Missouri Court Plan is continuing to be the most
successful plan yet devised for the selection and tenure of judges. It has taken
our judges completely out of partisan politics. The judges who were 'frozen'
in office by the adoption of the plan have become better judges; and the
additions to the Bench since the adoption of the plan have never been criticized
by the Press or the Bar .... "
"Because of the plan, Judge Roscoe P. Conkling, presently Chief Justice
of the Missouri Supreme Court, accepted appointment to the Supreme Court.
He was an experienced, able and outstanding lawyer with a most successful
practice in St. Joseph, Missouri, which he gave up to take the appointment.
He would not have done this had it been necessary for him to run for the
office in a partisan political campaign. The plan has attracted to the Bench
outstanding and successful lawyers."
4. The present Chief Justice, Roscoe P. Conkling, states:
"Our plan preserves the independence of the judiciary as a separate
branch of our state government, vigilant to protect and enforce the rights of
all citizens.
"Nearly fifteen years' experience with our method of selection has demon-
strated its effectiveness to bring to the Bench men of capacity and sound
experience who expect to make a judicial career wherein any political activity
is constitutionally forbidden. As a result, judges devote their entire energies
to judicial work, conscious that their tenure depends only upon a good record
upon the Bench and not upon political affiliation or the success of political
parties." (1955)
5. Justice Laurance M. Hyde, of the Supreme Court of Missouri, expresses
his opinion of the Plan:
"I think an outstanding feature of the plan is that it makes it possible
for every judge to be a better judge than he could have been under our former
system of election on a party ticket, because he does not have to put in any
time campaigning and can give all his time to his judicial work. Our judges
can now always be working on the next case instead of on the next election.
Furthermore, judicial qualities have been substituted for party affiliations as
the principal basis for selecting and retaining judges. Since the judges do not
have to run in party primaries or as party candidates, there is no political
pressure on the judges and our courts are out of politics. A judge does not
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have to worry about maintaining political fences. The result of all this is
that all of our appellate court dockets have been brought up to date for the
first time in a half century, and are being kept on a current basis. Improve-
ments have been made in bringing the circuit court dockets up to date in spite
of the increased business following the end of the war. Delays have been
lessened and expense of litigation reduced. The adoption of this plan is
undoubtedly the greatest improvement that has ever been made in the judicial
system in this state."
Judge Harold R. Medina of New York, a superb authority on this subject,
forcefully endorses the Plan. The following are excerpts from an interview
with Judge Medina:
Are there many lawyers with a big practice and a large income
who would be willing, as you were, to give it all up for a district judgeship ?"
"Yes," he said emphatically. "There's not a man at the Bar, however
distinguished his position, who would not gladly accept an appointment to
the bench-provided he could do so without being under any obligation.
That's the important point-no obligation. Any lawyer would do it .
if he didn't have to knuckle to anyone.
"It's a great honor to sit on the bench," he added thoughtfully. "And
more men are willing to serve the public decently than you realize. But no
man wants to compromise with his principles .... "
"What is the remedy?" Judge Medina was asked.
"Get an aroused public to demand some system of appointing judges
that isn't political, that's based on merit only. Missouri has done just this in
connection with her state court system and many other states are studying the
Missouri Plan. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
This evidence is irrefutable.
CONCLUSION
Experience shows that, whenever judicial change succeeds, it requires the
support of the public. The civic organizations before whom our Plan has
been presented have approved it. The list includes: the Pennsylvania State
Chamber of Commerce, the League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania, the
Chamber of Commerce of Greater Philadelphia, the Junior Chamber of Com-
merce of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia County Medical Society, the Women's
City Club of Philadelphia, the Civic Club of Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania
CIO Council, and Local 813, UAW-CIO of Philadelphia.
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The League of Women Voters last spring approved the Plan in their
biennial convention and the local Leagues throughout the state are now making
it a subject of study.
Our Plan has the approval of the Pennsylvania Bar Association and a
great number of other local bar associations.
Last spring a plebiscite was taken of the Philadelphia lawyers with the
question asked whether they approve or disapprove the Plan. 86% voted for
the Plan. In Bucks County, the entire bar, with only one dissenting vote,
favored the Plan.
Two of the foremost leaders of the bar of Pennsylvania, Horace Stern,
former Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and George Wharton
Pepper, have given splendid endorsements of it, as have two other nationally
known jurists, the late Arthur T. Vanderbilt and Judge Harold R. Medina.
Lawyers from the earliest days of our Republic have taken the leadership
in correcting shortcomings in government. Here is the No. 1 problem of our
profession that requires our leadership-to champion a system that will re-
establish the public's confidence in our courts by adopting our Plan for the
selection and security of tenure of worthy judges.
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